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Abstract 
 
A tension exists between the normative aspiration for greater equality between ethnic and religious 
groups in society and the empirical reality that ascendant groups benefit from the unequal social 
order. I explore how this tension manifests in the social sphere by examining how ethnic inequality 
shapes the formation of interethnic ties in an ethnically-ranked society. I examine intermarriages in 
Mindanao, a deeply-divided and ethnically-ranked society in the Global South. I find ethnic 
inequality is associated with both integrative and distancing forces. When ethnic inequality is low, 
individuals from high-ranked groups tend to inmarry, but low-ranked groups to outmarry. I suggest 
this divergence reflects the importance of status hierarchies. Intermarriages represent status mobility 
for subordinate groups but status threat for dominant groups. Ingroup preference intensifies for high-
ranked groups because they are anxious to preserve the distinctiveness of group boundaries and their 
status superiority. I establish these findings using census micro-data on over two million marriages. 
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There has been growing recognition in both policy discourse and scholarly research of the 
importance of inequality, not just between individuals and households, but also between social 
groups. Reducing disparities between ethnic, racial, and religious groups has, for instance, become 
one of the targets of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The prominence 
of the issue reflects not only a normative aspiration for greater fairness in society. Mounting 
empirical evidence also demonstrates the adverse effects of inequality between groups. Research 
has evinced ethnic inequality’s links with economic underdevelopment (Alesina, Michalopoulos, & 
Papaioannou, 2016), civil wars (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011; Gubler & Selway, 
2012), democratic breakdown (Huber & Suryanarayan, 2015), and poor public good provision 
(Baldwin & Huber, 2010). The rationale for reducing inequality between groups in society then 
appears clear.  
Contrary to this growing consensus, however, I suggest the empirical case for a more equal 
distribution of societal resources is not unequivocal in an ethnically-stratified society. I consider 
ethnic inequality’s relationship with another normatively-desirable objective: social integration. I 
posit lower ethnic inequality is associated with both integrative and distancing forces in an 
ethnically-ranked system. 	I identify these distinct forces by purposely examining how inequality 
affects the behaviour of advantaged ethnic groups separately from disadvantaged groups and 
contend that	ascendant	groups will behave differently because they benefit from the unequal social 
order and may resist redistribution that would alter it.  
Specifically, I consider marriage behavior across ethnic boundaries in a society with well-
established socio-economic disparities between ethnic groups. Intermarriages are widely-seen as a 
positive force for integration in ethnically diverse societies (Alba & Nee, 2003; Gordon, 1964; 
Kalmijn, 1998; Marcson, 1950). As such they are a useful barometer of the quality of intergroup 
relations. I posit that when ethnic inequality is low in a locality, individuals from the lower-ranked 
group will tend to outmarry. Outmarriage represents an integrative force in society. However, 
members of the higher-ranked group will tend to inmarry. Inmarriage is a distancing force in 
society. Ingroup preference will intensify then for superordinate groups; but weaken for 
subordinate groups. Their behaviours will diverge. 
This divergence, I argue, reflects the importance of status hierarchies. In contexts where the 
inequality between ethnic groups is low, I posit superordinate group members will feel anxiety for 
the proximate status of the subordinate group and seek to maintain the distinctiveness of their status 
superiority by marrying their coethnics. Inmarriage protects group boundaries, and in consequently 
contributes to social distance. In contrast, members of low-ranked groups will aspire to improve 
their status by up-marrying into the higher-ranked group when ethnic inequality is low. 
Outmarriage becomes a form of social mobility, and consequently facilitates social integration.  
These findings underscore the complexity of redistributive forces in ethnically-stratified 
systems. In deeply-ranked societies, equalizing or redistributive forces that alter the social 
hierarchy may have both positive and negative consequences for intergroup relations. The 
recognition of the possibility of downside effects to inequality reduction has implications for 
several other literatures. First, research on civil conflicts has focused predominantly on the 
motivation of excluded or disadvantaged groups to rebel (Ballentine & Sherman, 2003). While the 
grievances of subordinate groups are causally important, these findings suggest the threat to the 
superordinate group’s position should also be an integral part of theorization on civil wars. 
Redressing a subordinate group’s grievance risks generating a new grievance within the 
superordinate group. Second, the logic of status threat may also be relevant to theories of voting 
behaviour in ranked societies. Research has suggested that even poor members of high-ranked 
groups may vote against parties that promise redistribution because they fear the upward mobility 
of otherwise low-ranked groups and resent the resources redirected in their favour (Suryanarayan, 
forthcoming). The anxiety to preserve the existing and unequal social order is so powerful that 
individuals may even vote against their own economic self-interest.  
The evidence for these findings comes from the study of a deeply-divided society in the 
Global South. Mindanao, in the southern Philippines, comprises three ethno-religious groups whose 
differences in socio-economic status present an effective illustration of an ethnically-ranked system 
with a clear social hierarchy. Christian settlers sit at the apex, followed by the native Muslim Moro; 
and lastly the Lumad, the region’s other indigenous grouping. The integration of these groups has 
proved a challenge and Mindanao has been the location of a long-running insurgency waged by 
rebel groups, drawn from the native Muslim Moro population, resentful of their minoritization and 
dispossession by Christian settlers from outside the region. The study examines over two million 
marriages both within and between these three ranked groups, drawing on census micro-data 
released, unusually, for the entire population for the years 2000 and 2010.  
The article is structured as follows. Section one frames the study theoretically; section two 
describes the research design including the case selection of Mindanao, and the data and techniques 
used; section three presents the results; and section four discusses the findings and presents 
conclusions. 
 
Section 1 Theoretical framework 
 
Ethnic inequality 
 
The proposition that inequalities between groups matter as much, if not more, than 
inequalities between individuals and households underpins several distinct areas of empirical inquiry 
that have developed independently each of other. The limited links between these literatures, 
however, have resulted in the emergence of several terms to describe essentially the same concept. 
Horizontal inequalities, ethnic inequalities, group-based inequalities, and ethnic inequalities have all 
entered the social science lexicon. In the interests of consistency, I adopt the term ethnic inequality 
here. 
Ethnic inequality’s impact has been examined in relation to multiple phenomena and its 
effects found to be overwhelmingly adverse. Research on civil wars has documented, in an expanding 
number of studies, a robust relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict onset (Cederman 
et al., 2011; Gubler & Selway, 2012; Murshed & Gates, 2005; Østby, 2008; Stewart, 2010). Scholars 
have interpreted this as support for the causal importance of group grievances. Other work has 
examined ethnic inequality’s role in underdevelopment and public good provision (Alesina et al., 
2016; Baldwin & Huber, 2010; Stewart, 2002). Alesina et al. (2016) showed in a cross-national study 
that ethnic inequality has a strong, negative relationship with contemporary development levels. 
Baldwin and Huber (2010) challenged the consensus that ethnic diversity undermines public goods 
provision by showing ethnic inequality better explains the outcome. Yet other work has found ethnic 
inequality to affect unfavourably democratic stability (Huber & Suryanarayan, 2015) and the quality 
of government (Kyriacou, 2013). 
In contrast with the mounting evidence of ethnic inequality’s adverse political and economic 
effects, there has been comparatively little research examining how it operates in the social sphere. 
How exactly does inequality between groups affect the social interaction between them? In 
considering what influences interethnic relations, research has focused primarily on the impact of 
ethnic diversity rather than ethnic inequality. Putnam’s (2010) well-known argument that higher 
ethnic diversity lowers trust not only between ethnic groups, but in society in general causing people 
to ‘hunker down’, has profoundly shaped debate in the public sphere on the merits of diversity. Yet 
some scholars have questioned this claim and suggested that, at least in the context of the United 
States, deep and persistent racial inequalities may lie behind low levels of societal trust (Hero, 2003; 
Portes, 1998). Empirical work has explicitly examined the relationship between racial income 
inequality and social capital and found trust to decline in the context of greater inequality (Alesina 
& La Ferrara, 2002; Tesei, 2017). However, while trust is an important dimension of interethnic 
relations, little research has looked at how inequality affects the formation of concrete social ties 
across group boundaries.  
 
Interethnic marriage and integration  
 Yet interethnic ties are important. In ethnically diverse societies, the social ties between 
ethnic groups are widely-viewed as an indicator of social integration. In ethnically-divided 
societies, where group boundaries may be deeply-inscribed by violence, these ties are seen also a 
source of social stability. Several prominent theories of intergroup conflict emphasise cross-ethnic 
ties as conducive to co-existence. Laitin and Fearon (1996) well-known game-theoretic model of 
intergroup cooperation implies that as interethnic interactions increase, the incentive for social 
stability grows. Peace is maintained because a ‘defection’ by an outgroup member would require an 
indiscriminate and costly reprisal by all ingroup members against all outgroup members given the 
former’s inability to identify and punish the defector. Varshney (2001) identified pre-existing 
interethnic associational ties as the reason why, following the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 
1992, certain Indian cities resisted violence, but others with weaker Hindu-Muslim ties did not. The 
cross-group ties countervailed the in-group ties that would otherwise bring and bind individuals 
together in an isolating and exclusionary form of solidarity. Putnam (2000) expanded his concept of 
social capital to distinguish between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ varieties. Bridging social capital, 
resulting from ties across groups, builds trust and strengthens social cohesion and has led to the 
claim it may also reduce violent conflict (World Bank, Colletta, & Cullen, 2000). 
Ethnic intermarriage represents a particular strong and durable form of cross-ethnic tie. 
Such marriages bring together not only two individuals but also, potentially, two social networks 
that may otherwise rarely interact (Qian & Lichter, 2007). Furthermore, the children from mixed 
marriages may weaken identity boundaries and help preserve the integrative potential of the union 
for the next generation (Stephan & Stephan, 1989). A large body of sociological research has 
argued for intermarriage’s integrative potential through the process of assimilation (Alba & Nee, 
2003; Gordon, 1964). While recent research has suggested its integrative effect may be over-stated 
(Okun & Khait-Marelly, 2010; Song, 2009), assimilation theory, along with empirical work in 
conflict studies, generally views intermarriage as a positive force to be promoted in society.  
In explaining their formation, existing theory has conceptualized intermarriages in terms of 
both preferences and opportunities to establish ties across group boundaries. Two well-known 
explanations of intermarriage, assortative mating and status exchange theory, both implicitly 
emphasize preferences. Positive assortative mating draws on the logic of homophily: individuals tend 
to associate with individuals similar to themselves. Endogamy (marriage within one’s ethnic group) 
and educational homogamy (marriage to someone with similar educational status) are two 
empirically robust patterns of positive assortative mating (Blossfeld, 2009). Interethnic marriages 
may arise then when education becomes a more desirable life-partner characteristic than ethnicity in 
society. In modern, advanced economies, educational homogamy is more likely to dominate ethnic 
endogamy, in turn making intermarriage more likely.  
Status exchange theory emphasizes the preference to trade personal for group status. Merton 
(1941) first hypothesized that high status “Blacks” in the US may marry low status “Whites”. Status 
exchange has since been tested in a variety of contexts outside of the United States and evidence 
adduced that highly-educated individuals from low-ranked groups do marry lesser-educated 
individuals from high-ranked groups (Choi, Tienda, Cobb-Clark, & Sinning, 2012; Guetto & 
Azzolini, 2015). Status exchange remains, however, a contested hypothesis as disagreement persists 
over the methodologically appropriate way to evaluate it (Gullickson & Fu, 2010; Kalmijn, 2010; 
Rosenfeld, 2005). 
While assortative mating and status exchange emphasize preferences, the opportunity to 
marry across group boundaries is also consequential. Kalmijn (1998) synthesized both preferences 
and opportunities into a comprehensive enumeration of the factors driving intermarriage. He 
theorized intermarriage as a function of individual preferences, typically for socioeconomic and 
cultural resources in a partner, and the preferences of influential third parties, typically manifested in 
norms and expectations set by the family, Church, or state. These preferences are in turn expressed 
through the structural opportunities and constraints of the marriage market (Becker, 1973), 
commonly defined by the size and geography of the groups.  
 
Status and ethnically-ranked systems 
 
In theorizing then how a factor such as ethnic inequality may affect the formation of social 
ties across ethnic boundaries, both preference and opportunity channels merit consideration. Blau 
(1977) first theorized that the coincidence of a nominal parameter (such as ethnicity or religion) 
with a ranked or graduated parameter (such as socio-economic status) in society will create a 
structural constraint on the macrosocial integration of groups. The imbalance in the number of 
individuals of similar rank between groups will reduce the opportunity for intermarriage. As the 
socio-economic distance increases between groups, there will logically be fewer individuals of 
similar socio-economic status to oneself in the other group with whom to associate. Blau’s view on 
the operation of inequality through an opportunity channel reflects his broader belief in the 
importance of relative group size. 
In contrast, other work has also argued for the importance of a preference-based channel. 
Rytina, Blau, Blum, and Schwartz (1988) have argued that increased inequality intensifies 
individual sensitivity to status differences in society. The preference to marry someone of similar 
socio-economic status grows stronger when inequality is high. These opportunity and preference-
based channels both point to the expectation of fewer intermarriages where ethnic inequality is 
high. Conversely, as the socio-economic status between groups equalizes, we would expect 
intermarriages to increase.  
The theoretical logic of the preference-based channel, however, is incomplete. It does not 
consider the preferences of each partner to the marriage separately. Yet this is likely to be 
important in ethnically-ranked societies where group boundaries are highly salient. Anti-
miscegenation laws in ranked societies such as pre-civil rights United States and apartheid South 
Africa reflect the importance to dominant groups of maintaining status boundaries. Members of 
high-ranked groups are likely then to have different preferences to low-ranked group members. 
These preferences may manifest in the choices they make regarding the ties they establish: in what 
neighbourhood to live, with whom to do business, which political party to support, and indeed 
whom to choose as a life partner. 
Ranked systems imply the existence of an established social order or status hierarchy. I 
conceptualize status as multidimensional by adapting Weber’s (1978) notion of inequality which 
sets out three bases for graduated differentiation or stratification in society: resources in the 
economic sphere; power in the political sphere; and prestige, esteem, or worth in the social sphere. 
These dimensions can and often do coincide and taken together they define a group’s overall 
position in the social hierarchy. However, they are independent and distinct forces (Ridgeway 
2014) and variation in one dimension can alter the group’s overall position in the social hierarchy 
even if the other dimensions remain unchanged. Social prestige for instance, often the historical 
legacy of colonial, imperialist, feudal, caste- or slave-based societies (Horowitz, 1985), typically 
endures longer than material differences based on income, wealth, education, or even state control. 
Thus a group’s position in the social order will alter when its resources and power change, even if 
its social prestige does not. 
Theories of ranked systems emphasize shifts in a group’s relative position in the social 
order as a powerful motivational force. When a symbolic threat such as a perceived change in the 
status hierarchy intensifies, it creates anxiety within the high-ranked group and strengthens ingroup 
feelings such as loyalty, solidarity, and favoritism. This anxiety may even motivate ethnic conflict 
(Horowitz, 1985). Experimental work in social psychology also confirms support for inequality 
from high-ranked groups increases when status threats intensify (Morrison, Fast, & Ybarra, 2009). I 
hypothesize such status threats also drive decisions over whether to establish ties within or outside 
of one’s ethnic group in an ethnically-ranked society. In communities where the socio-economic 
distance between low- and high-ranked members is small, that is ethnic inequality is low, members 
of high-ranked groups feel anxiety for the proximate status of the lower-ranked group. They 
respond by seeking to maintain the distinctiveness of the group boundary and the group’s status 
superiority by choosing to inmarry.  
 
H1. Where ethnic inequality is low and the socio-economic distance small between groups, 
the chances of individuals from high-ranked groups inmarrying increase. 
 
In contrast, members of low-ranked groups feel less constrained by the existing social order 
and aspire to take advantage of the opportunity to marry up by choosing a partner from the higher-
ranked group. 
 
H2.Where ethnic inequality is low and the socio-economic distance small between groups, 
the chances of individuals from low-ranked groups outmarrying increase.   
 
Section II Research design 
 
Case selection: Mindanao, Philippines 
 
I examine these hypotheses in the context of Mindanao, the southernmost of the three main 
island groups that make up the Philippines. Three ethno-religious cleavages dominate and divide its 
22 million inhabitants into three groupings: Christian settlers; native Muslim Moro; and the Lumad, 
Mindanao’s other indigenous peoples who do not identify as Moro. These groups are also ranked. 
Christian settlers from the two northern island groups, Visayas and Luzon, hold the highest status. 
Their dominant position is derived in large part from Spanish colonial conquest which established a 
Catholic majority in the archipelago that would become strongly associated with the Filipino 
national identity. As the nation’s core ‘ethnie’ (Smith, 1986) its elite class achieved dominance in 
state institutions and control of much of the national economy. In contrast, the Muslim Moro and 
Lumad occupy subordinate positions in the social hierarchy (Gutierrez & Borras, 2004; Rodil, 
1993). They represent numerical minorities unassimilated to the Filipino national identity. The 
Moro possess an intermediate rank having successfully resisted Spanish colonization, assured 
themselves representation in local political institutions, and established a relatively stable position 
in the local economy. The Lumad occupy the bottom rank with the weakest political organization 
and representation, lowest socio-economic status, and least social prestige of the three groups. 
Figure 1 summarizes the ranking of these three groups in each of Weber’s status dimensions. It is 
worth noting important sub-ethnic divisions exist within each group, most prominently the Muslim 
tribes, whose patterns of endogamy and exogamy merit analysis in their own right. 
Notwithstanding intra-group dynamics and the fluid and constructed significance of the identities, 
Moro, Lumad, and Christian settlers remain the three most salient political and social boundaries in 
Mindanao. 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
 Although Mindanao may be unfamiliar to many social scientists in Europe and North 
America, it is nonetheless a valuable case to study for three reasons. First, it is an example of ethnic 
divisions arising within the Global South. Most of the world’s ethnic diversity is concentrated in 
countries within this bloc, the result partly of colonial-era border-fixing and rising South-to-South 
migration. The latter now exceeds South-to-North flows (International Organization for Migration, 
2015). An important gap exists in our understanding of the forces shaping ethnic integration in 
countries within the Global South. Second, there are evident disparities in status across the three 
principal ethno-religious groups in Mindanao. Its social hierarchy is clearly defined. Thirdly, 
Mindanao’s ethnic divisions are deep, having been inscribed by organized conflict and ongoing 
violence along ethno-religious boundaries. It represents then a particularly difficult integration 
challenge and the forces that drive intermarriage will need to be powerful to overcome the forces 
that separate Mindanao’s ethnic groups.  
Early contact with Islam in the 15th century provided Mindanao with a historical trajectory 
and regional identity distinct from those of the two northern island groups, Luzon and Visayas, 
which in contrast encountered Christianity in the 16th century as a result of Spanish colonial 
conquest (Majul, 1973). Islamic influence manifested itself through the conversion of much, though 
not all, of the indigenous population and through the establishment of sultanates, most notably 
those of Sulu, Maguindanao, and Buayan. Spanish attempts to annex the region were forcibly 
resisted by the Moro and their Sultanates remained outside of Spanish control for nearly 300 years. 
Following Spain’s loss of the colony to the United States in 1898, a period of relative stability 
ensued in large part through accommodations reached between prominent local Muslim elites and 
the new American colonial administration (Abinales, 2010). However, resistance re-surfaced after 
independence in 1946 in the face of attempts to incorporate Mindanao into a modern Filipino 
nation-state. Unlike the Moro, however, the Lumad as a smaller, less-cohesive minority, did not 
engage in armed rebellion.    
At the root of the post-independence conflict lay the mass migration of Filipino Christian 
settlers from Luzon and Visayas to Mindanao. The resettlement program, initiated under American 
rule and expanded after independence, contributed to the minoritization and dispossession of the 
native population. Mindanao’s Muslim population, today numbering nearly 5 million, dwindled 
between 1903 and 2010 from 76 to 22 percent. The Lumad, who presently count over 3 million 
individuals, experienced an even greater diminution in demographic significance. The transfer of 
much ancestral land into foreign, often settler, hands as a result of the American policy of 
mandatory land registration compounded the sense of dispossession among Mindanao’s native 
population. Their marginalization is reflected in some of the lowest education, health, and poverty 
scores for all of the Philippines in the provinces and municipalities where Moro and Lumad are 
concentrated (McDoom, Reyes, Mina, & Asis, 2018; McKenna, 1998).  
 The historical injustice and contemporary disadvantage of the indigenous population 
inspired several armed Moro separatist movements after independence. The Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) waged an insurgency seeking an independent Bangsamoro (Moro Land). 
The war, peaking between 1972-76, claimed, by one estimate, 50-100,000 lives and displaced a 
million more (Kaufman, 2011). The conflict has since then been characterized by episodes of 
violence and periodic ceasefires. An initial agreement to create the Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM) in 1991 was rejected by the MNLF’s principal breakaway rival, the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) who continued to fight. A later peace treaty with the MILF, in 
2014, to replace ARMM with the ‘Bangsamoro Political Entity,’ in turn angered members of the 
MNLF who launched an armed attack again in 2015. More recently, two minor insurgent groups, 
having affiliated themselves with the trans-national militant organization Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL), seized control of an important sub-region, Marawi City, in Mindanao in 2017. 
ISIL subsequently declared this territory to be part of its proto-state Caliphate. At the time of 
writing, a comprehensive peace deal involving the various factions remains elusive.  
 
Data sources 
 
I draw on micro-data from the 2000 and 2010 population censuses for the Philippines. 
Unusually for a national census, the Philippines National Statistics Office released individual-level 
records for all households in Mindanao providing an extraordinarily rich source of information. 
The 2000 and 2010 datasets contain detailed information on 18.3 and 21.9 million individuals 
respectively. Reliance on the population rather than on a sample eliminated the risk of under-
sampling potentially rare events such as intermarriages. As there had been administrative boundary 
changes in the ten-year interval, I realigned the 2010 data to make them comparable with the 2000 
data. The Philippines’ territorial organization comprises four administrative levels and in 2000 
Mindanao was composed of 6 regions, 25 provinces, 430 municipalities, and 10,019 barangays. 
 
Empirical strategy 
 I employ two techniques both to probe and to test the hypotheses. First, as exploratory 
probes I report simple descriptive statistics and conduct t-tests comparing the means of the 
independent variables for endogamously and exogamously-married individuals. I also calculate 
odds ratios for cross-group unions.  Odds ratios, commonly reported in intermarriage studies, 
indicate the odds of inmarrying (or cohabiting) relative to the odds of outmarrying. They have a 
distinct advantage over other descriptive statistics as they take into account the relative sizes of the 
groups. This is important as members of minority groups, faced with a smaller within-group 
marriage market, would be more likely to have to outmarry. These intermarriages would appear 
larger in proportional terms for the smaller group than for the larger group reflecting more different 
opportunities between groups than different preferences. Odds ratios are calculated as follows: 
 
Odds Ratio = 		 "#$%"# 	 	 "&$%"& 	  
 
where p1 is the probability of an individual from group1 outmarrying and p2 is the probability of an 
individual from group2 outmarrying.  An odds ratio of 1 indicates members of the group are as 
likely to inmarry as to outmarry. Odds ratios above 1 indicate the extent of endogamy within the 
group. 
Second, to test the hypotheses while controlling for other potential influences on 
intermarriage rates, I use logistic regression with an outcome variable of whether a married 
individual partnered with someone from their own group or not. The decision to employ logit 
models represents a departure from much of the previous research on intermarriage where log-
linear models have been more commonplace (Qian, 1997). Log-linear models take the marriage 
itself as the unit of analysis and their principal advantage is the ability to control for differences in 
the marginal distributions of variables of interest such as gender, ethnicity, and education. 
However, I purposely take the individual as the unit of analysis in order to examine the forces and 
motivations driving each partner to the marriage separately as I hypothesize that low and high-
ranked group members will each behave differently. Logit models can, moreover, be specified to 
control for differences in the overall number of men, women, ethnic group members, and 
educated/uneducated individuals in the marriage market. Individual-level analysis has been a 
longstanding gap in existing empirical work on intermarriage (Kalmijn, 1998) and to that end I 
constructed six separate individual-level datasets for married males and females of each of the three 
ethnic groups.  
Logit models offer three further benefits worth considering in the methodological trade-off 
with log-linear models: (i) they allow for the specification of a larger number of co-variates without 
any sacrifice of interpretability, as well as for the inclusion of continuous and categorical variables; 
(ii) they allow for the estimation of the relative substantive and statistical significance of each co-
variate individually; and (iii) they allow for the marriage market to be defined at different levels of 
locality. It is unrealistic, particularly in developing countries where geographic mobility is limited, 
to assume the marriage market is always nation-wide. Moreover, individuals most commonly meet 
their life-partners in school, in the workplace, or in the neighborhood i.e. social spaces usually 
close to their residence. Logit models allow for the construction of explanatory variables at 
different spatial or administrative levels to account for the possibility of localized marriage 
markets. To allow meaningful comparison of the relative substantive importance of each 
explanatory variable both within and across regression models, I report results both without and 
with standardized dependent and independent variables (Tables 3 and 4).  
 
Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable indicates whether a married individual has married within (0) or 
outside (1) of his or her ethno-religious group. As community-level determinants of intermarriage 
are constructed for the year 2000, to ensure they are temporally antecedent in their effect I examine 
only those marriages contracted between 2000 and 2010. The census micro-data do not indicate the 
year of union, so I follow a common practice in studies of intermarriage and examine married 
individuals from a particular age cohort. In this case I examined individuals aged 15-34 years old in 
the year 2010 given that the median age of first marriage in the Philippines in 2011 was 25.3 years 
for women and 28.0 for men.  
 
Independent variables 
 
Ethnic inequality 
 
To capture the extent to which groups differ in socio-economic status, I construct a measure of 
ethnic inequality at the community level for the year 2000. I use the Group-weighted Coefficient of 
Variation (GCOV) given its straightforward interpretation and its suitability for use as an 
explanatory variable (Mancini, Stewart, & Brown, 2008). It compares the difference between each 
group’s mean with the population mean on the quantity of interest and takes into account the size of 
each group in each locality. It is given by the following formula. 
 
Ethnic Inequality (GCOV) = '( )( −	) +,( #&  
 
where y is the quantity of the variable of interest (education level here); )( is the mean value of y 
for groupr; ) is the mean value of y for the population, R is the number of groups; and pr is 
groupr’s population share. The measure is scaled from 0 to 1 where 0 represents perfect equality 
between groups. To facilitate a cleaner interpretation I construct separate GCOV measures for each 
ethnic group rather than rely on a single measure of aggregate inequality between all groups.  
Education is a powerful marker of socio-economic status and I focus on educational inequality 
in the analysis. I build a simple five-point variable from the census categories to capture an 
individual’s educational level. The scale was chosen to reflect meaningful differences in 
educational levels and broadly correspond to: (i) no education; (ii) some or completed primary 
education; (iii) some or completed secondary education; (iv) some or completed post-secondary or 
vocational education; (v) some or completed college education or higher academic degree.  
 
Control Variables 
 
(i) Opportunities in the marriage market 
 
Becker (1973) introduced the concept of a marriage market in which individuals compete to 
maximize their utility consistent with their preferences. I construct three variables to capture the 
characteristics of the marriage market that would affect the structural opportunity for intermarriage.  
First, to capture the size of the pool of available life partners from different groups, I use the 
number of adults who do not belong to the individual’s group as a proportion of all adults in the 
community in the year 2000: the larger the proportion, the greater the opportunity to out-marry. 
Second, to capture the importance of geography in the marriage market I construct a measure of 
social segregation in the year 2000.  Specifically, I use the index of dissimilarity commonly used in 
studies of racial segregation in U.S. cities (Massey & Denton, 1988). Conceptually, it is the 
percentage of one group who would have to change their geographic sub-division (Filipino 
barangay) in order to create an even distribution throughout the larger geographical unit (Filipino 
municipality). It is given by the formula:  
 Segregation	(dissimilarity) = 	 >? '? − 	@ /2C@ 1 − @E?F$  
 
where ti and pi are the total population and group proportion of the geographic sub-division 
(barangay), i, and T and P are the population size and group proportion of the larger geographical 
unit (municipality) under comparison.  The index is scaled from 0 to 1 where a higher score 
indicates a higher level of segregation.   
 As settlement patterns, which define opportunities in the marriage market, may also reflect 
the preferences of individuals to live with their coethnics or in places where intermarriage is 
common, I also control for in-migration. I construct a binary variable from the census data 
indicating whether the individual had migrated into a community within the last five years or not. 
Although not a perfect means of disentangling opportunity from preference, it goes some way to 
isolating the distinctive effects of each. Third, I calculate the population density in each locality 
given the theoretical logic that as the micro-spatial distances between individuals decline, the 
likelihood of micro-social interaction increases. More densely-populated areas may signify more 
opportunity for cross-cultural contact.  
 
(ii) Other controls 
 
I also include in the model specification an individual’s age, educational level, the age 
difference with their partner measured in years, and a binary variable indicating the household’s 
poverty status based on the Philippines National Household Poverty Survey where 1 indicates a 
household in poverty.  
 
Robustness checks 
 
 I construct several alternate variables and run 36 alternate model specifications in the 
regression analysis for inclusion in an online appendix. First, given the potential sensitivity of 
analytical results to the level of spatial analysis (McDoom & Gisselquist, 2016), I built and tested 
aggregate variables on ethnic inequality and opportunities on the marriage market at both the 
municipality and barangay levels (Table 5). Second, to ensure the ethnic inequality variable is 
insensitive to the choice of scale, I also built and tested a 10-point as well as 5-point educational 
variable (Table 6). Third, I report the models with clustered and unclustered standard errors given 
the possibility of individual-level correlation within municipalities (Table 7). Fourth, I constructed 
an alternate variable to capture spatial segregation (Table 8). Fifth, given the possibility that the 15-
34 year old marriage cohort has distinctive characteristics and also that some cohort members may 
have married before 2000, I also run the models for marriages of all age cohorts together (Table 9). 
Lastly, I check for collinearity between the predictor variables using variance inflation factors that 
measure how much the variance of an estimated regression coefficient is inflated relative to the 
situation where it is not linearly related to other predictor variables (Table 10). 
 
Section III Results 
 
(i) Overall Marriage Patterns 
 
 Unions between Muslim Moro, Christian Settlers, and the Lumad are rare events in 
Mindanao. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on marriages and cohabitations in 2010.  Only 
2.7% of all marriages were across ethno-religious boundaries. Insofar as such intermarriage 
indicates social integration, Mindanao is clearly a deeply-divided society. However, there is 
important variation. First, there is a significant difference between marriages and cohabitations. 
Individuals are unsurprisingly far more likely to cohabit with a partner from a different group than 
they are to marry one. For all three groups, the endogamy odds ratios, which take into account the 
relative size of groups, are lower for marriages than for cohabitations. One evident interpretation of 
this difference is that marriages are more likely to involve the approval of third parties such as 
families, communities, and religious establishments because they are socially significant 
institutions. Cohabitations, in contrast, are more private arrangements likely to engage only the two 
individuals concerned.  The difference then is likely indicative of social forces, either norms or 
sanctions, that govern partner decisions in Mindanao.   
 
Table 1 here 
 
 Second, there is significant variation in endogamy between the three groups. Muslim Moro 
are by far the most socially-closed group. 3.0% of Muslim Moro male have outmarried; their 
endogamy odds ratios is high at 5733. By contrast, the Lumad are by far the most socially-open 
group. 14.3% of adult Lumad have outmarried and the odds ratio is 212.  Christian settlers fall in 
between the two groups with 4.0% having outmarried and with an odds ratio of 336.  Why do the 
Lumad and Muslim Moro, who are both marginalized and similarly-sized minority groups in 
Mindanao, behave so differently in their partner decisions? One possible interpretation is the role of 
religious institutions in marriage decisions. The Muslim Moro have a single and more formalized 
set of religious institutions.  Their religious leadership (ulama), religious establishments (mosques), 
and religious schools (madrassahs) all represent powerful forces that operate to control or 
otherwise socialize group members. Muslim marriages (nikah) are religiously solemnized. In 
Mindanao, Islam is also overwhelmingly Sunni, of the Shafi’i school of jurisprudence (fiqh), with 
very few adherents of other denominations such as Shia or Ahmadiyya.  By contrast, the Lumad 
have a more diverse set of religions and consequently religious institutions.  They identify as 
Christians, Muslims, and also with tribal religions.  Furthermore, Christian Lumad come from a 
wide variety of denominations, both Catholic and numerous Protestant sub-denominations. Lumad 
who practise tribal beliefs also lack the more formal set of religious institutions common to 
Christianity and Islam.  The difference in socializing powers of Moro and Lumad is also reflected 
in the within-group differences between marriage and cohabitation.  The endogamy odds ratio for 
Muslim Moro marriages within the 15-34 year old cohort is far higher (3878) than the endogamy 
odds ratio for Muslim Moro cohabitations (54).  In contrast, the marriage (176) and cohabitation 
(60) odds ratios for the Lumad are much closer in magnitude.  It makes little difference whether a 
Lumad marries or cohabits with a non-Lumad because the socializing effect of group membership 
is much weaker.    
 Third, there is variation in endogamy between men and women across the three groups. 
Gender matters to differing degrees in each group. Muslim Moro women (2.2%) are less likely to 
marry or cohabit outside of their group than Moro men (3.2%); Christian settler women (3.7%) are 
about as likely to do so as their male counterparts (4.2%); Lumad females (18.5%), interestingly, 
are more likely than Lumad males (14.8%) to do so. The choice of life partners of a group’s 
women-folk is of high importance because it is perceived as tied to the survival and preservation of 
the group’s identity. Women are sexually policed to different degrees between groups reflecting the 
extent to which social forces dominate individual choice within these groups.   
   
(ii) Hypotheses 1 and 2: Ethnic Inequality 
 
Ethnic inequality is a powerful and robust determinant of marriage outside of the group. 
Consistent with the hypothesized status anxiety logic, the effect is contingent on the social rank of 
the ethnic group: high-ranked members tend to inmarry when the distance in the socioeconomic 
status between low and high-ranked groups is low in the community (hypothesis 1); low-ranked 
members tend to outmarry (hypothesis 2). Table 2 reports t-test comparisons of the means of 
predictor variables. The mean ethnic inequality score is higher for Christian settlers for outmarry 
than those who inmarry; and lower for Muslim Moro and Lumad who outmarry than those who 
inmarry. These differences are all statistically significant in all cases.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
The multivariate logit models (Table 3) confirm this difference is substantively and statistically 
significant even when controlling for other factors. The marginal change in ethnic inequality 
increases the probability of outmarriage for Moro and Lumad males by 15% and 40% respectively; 
whereas it decreases the probability of outmarriage for Christian settler males by 11%.1  These 
findings also hold whether ethnic inequality is measured at the municipality or at the barangay 
levels, though are weaker at the barangay level implying that the marriage market is not highly-
localized. An interpretation based on the logic of status threat would attribute this divergence to the 
anxiety felt by a high-rank group member for the distinctiveness of their status superiority and to 
the aspiration by a lower-ranked group member for upward mobility through outmarriage. In terms 
of gender, the effect is larger for Christian settler and Muslim Moro men than women suggesting 
men feel the status threat more acutely; Lumad women, in contrast, appear to enjoy about the same 
autonomy as Lumad men.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
(iii) Opportunity variables 
 
In order to increase the confidence of a preference-based interpretation of ethnic equality 
effects, I specified three conceptually distinct variables to control for the role of opportunity in the 
marriage market in determining whether individuals married within or outside of their ethnic group. 
First, increasing the size of the pool of available candidates from outside of one’s group predictably 
increased the chances of out-marriage for all three ethnic groups. The marginal change in the pool 
of outmarriage partners increased the probability of outmarriage for Moro, Lumad, and Christian 
males by 9%, 3%, and 7% respectively. Its substantive importance relative to ethnic inequality is 
varies across ethnic groups. While its effect is larger for Christian and Muslims, it is smaller for 
Lumad. For Christian men, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of non-coethnics 
increases the odds of outmarriage by 0.13 standard deviations compared with only a 0.08 standard 
deviation increase for ethnic inequality. In contrast, for Lumad men, the standard deviations 
increases are 0.04 and 0.21 for group size and ethnic inequality respectively.  
Second, ethnic settlement patterns, as measured by spatial segregation, were also a strong 
predictor of outmarriage. When the three ethnic groups lived in closer proximity to each other, the 
likelihood of marrying across ethnic boundaries again increased. The marginal change in spatial 
segregation increases the probability of outmarriage for Moro, Lumad, and Christian males by 7%, 
																																																						
1	All marginal effects are calculated using representative values for discrete variables, specifically individuals from 
poor households who did not migrate into the community, and mean values for continuous variables. 	
16%, and 12% respectively. Lastly, I considered population density relying on the conceptual logic 
that as the micro-spatial distances between individuals decreased, micro-social interactions would 
increase. Contrary to this logic, however, I found that in areas where population density was high, 
outmarriages were low. In interpreting this counterintuitive finding, it is worth noting the 
population density variable lacks an essential piece of information: it does not tell us whether those 
individuals who lived in close proximity to others were of the same or of different ethnicity as their 
neighbours. If the population in a locality was ethnically homogenous, for instance, this would 
account for the negative relationship with intermarriage observed.  
 
Section IV Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This article has sought to extend our understanding of ethnic inequality beyond the 
economic and political spheres by examining its relationship with social integration and 
specifically how it affects the formation of marital ties across group boundaries. It makes a novel 
and important conceptual decision to analyse the marital choices of high status groups separately 
from those of low status groups. It does so because it posits and finds these groups will have 
opposing preferences: high-ranked groups will tend to inmarry when ethnic inequality is low; low-
ranked groups to outmarry. Importantly, these findings hold whilst controlling for the opportunity 
to marry outside of the group – including the relative sizes of groups - and thus underscore a 
preference-based interpretation of the divergence in marital behaviors.  
In explaining why this divergence will arise, I have argued for the importance of social 
hierarchies and the power of status anxiety in ranked systems. Ingroup preference intensifies for the 
high-status group when the social distance to the low-status group is small because its members are 
anxious to preserve the distinctiveness of the group boundaries that define the social order in which 
their position is dominant. In contrast, members of low-status groups outmarry when the social 
distance is small because outmarriage represents an opportunity for upward social mobility. Ethnic 
inequality then has both integrative and distancing effects. This finding highlights the tension 
between the normative aspiration for greater equality in society and the empirical reality that 
certain advantaged groups have reason to preserve an unequal social order and to feel threatened by 
redistribution that would alter it. 
These findings may have implications for several other literatures. Ethnic inequality is a 
well-established force in ethnic civil wars, for example (Cederman et al., 2011; Østby, 2008). The 
disparity breeds resentment and creates grievances that motivate subordinate groups to rebel. This 
article, however, highlights the importance of considering the calculus of both subordinate (low-
status) and superordinate (high-status) groups. Ethnic conflicts, at their core, typically concern 
redistribution in either one or two of Weber’s dimensions of inequality: economic resources and/or 
political power. Redistributive conflicts then risk altering the existing social order and status 
hierarchy. This article has found threats to the status hierarchy strengthen ingroup preference 
within dominant (high-status) groups. Psycho-social theory has documented the concomitant 
increases in group identification, loyalty, and solidarity that such ingroup biases generate (Brewer 
& Kramer, 1985). One theoretical implication then is for conflict duration. The magnitude of the 
status threat may affect the strength of a dominant group’s motivation – and thus the resources it is 
willing to invest in combatting a rebellion - to protect its privileged position. This logic is 
consistent with psycho-social theories of ethnic conflict that emphasize the importance of symbolic 
threats to the relative group ranking (Horowitz, 1985).  
The findings on the importance of social hierarchy and status may also help deepen our 
understanding of how ethnic inequality shapes social movements and electoral politics in ranked 
societies. In response to the rising status of subordinate (low-status) groups, dominant (high-status) 
groups may organize themselves in opposition to this threat to a social order in which they are 
ascendant. This behaviour is visible, for instance, when migrant inflows motivate nativist or 
nationalist sentiments that lead to movements to preserve or return to the status quo ex ante. 
Migrants should not attain higher status than natives. Policies that promote or privilege non-core 
groups generally, such as affirmative action programs in employment and education or 
multiculturalist-inspired minority rights, also generate resentment from high-status groups. They 
perceive preferences and rights for disadvantaged groups as an opportunity for social mobility and 
the bestowment of protections denied to themselves (Brown, Langer, & Stewart, 2012). Concerns 
for the social order and status may also underlie opposition from dominant groups to political 
parties that promise redistribution or otherwise seek to improve the position of disadvantaged 
groups. So strong is the anxiety to preserve the asymmetric nature of the social structure that even 
poor members of dominant groups, who would benefit from redistribution, may vote against such 
parties. 
The salience of status points to an important scope condition for these findings: the ethnic 
groups in question must exist in a ranked system. We would expect then to find similar results in 
places with disadvantaged ethnic and religious groups such as the Malay in Singapore, the 
Rohingya in Myanmar, and the Hazara in Afghanistan. It remains to be investigated whether 
unranked groups such as the Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Yoruba, Hausa, and Ibo in 
Nigeria, or the Creoles and East Indians in Guyana would behave similarly. But the importance of 
status also invites the question of how a ranked system is defined. Rank or status is conventionally 
thought of in terms of the constituent dimensions in which it is measured and in this article Weber’s 
tripartite classification of resources, power, and esteem has been adopted. However, status or rank 
may also be measured in a fourth dimension: time. Intuitively, the duration of inequality in society 
may embed expectations in respect of change among both subordinate and superordinate groups. 
Persistent inequality, which implies a deeply-entrenched social order, would generate the strongest 
response from dominant groups to attempts to alter it. Furthermore, societies are not always clearly 
ranked or unranked; degrees of ranking may matter and ranking is better conceptualized as a 
continuous as well as a longitudinal variable (Gisselquist, 2013).  
These findings, however, also have several important qualifications. First, the claims in 
respect of inequality are predictive, not causal. The techniques and data used simply observe an 
association between ethnic inequality on the one hand and intermarriage on the other. Reliance on 
temporally antecedent determinants help establish the causal direction – inequality, for instance, is 
measured in year 2000 - and theory helps make observed associations more causally credible. 
However, it remains possible untheorized, unobserved factors are driving these findings and that 
ethnic inequality is itself endogenous to intermarriage. The absence of ties across ethnic boundaries 
may entrench existing socio-economic disparities between ethnic groups. Second, the status anxiety 
mechanism I suggest is not tested empirically, but instead implied theoretically. A different 
interpretation of the observed marriage patterns is conceivable. Furthermore, although the article 
suggests status concerns account for the divergence, it does not claim status is the only 
characteristic other than ethnicity or religion individuals value in life-partners. The findings simply 
indicate the marital decisions men and women from different ethnic groups make on average. 
Individuals may privilege other characteristics - character, physique, intelligence, moral values, and 
political beliefs, inter alia – over status in their partner. Logically, this must happen as if dominant 
groups always inmarried there would be no-one to marry subordinate group members. Third, it 
remains an evident question whether these findings hold in contexts where violence has not 
inscribed ethnic and religious divisions in society. In theory, the difference with a violently-divided 
society should be a matter of degree rather than of kind. The social forces separating groups will 
simply be stronger and the status anxieties deeper. However, it remains an unanswered question 
until more empirical work engages the individual rather than the marriage as the unit of analysis in 
studies of marriage-driven integration. The methodological approach pursued here - analyzing men, 
women, and ethnic groups separately - is regrettably rare.  
  
	
	
Figure	1.	Group	rank	or	status	as	a	multidimensional	concept	in	Mindanao	
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Christian	settlers	 1	 1	 1	
Muslim	Moro	 2	 2	 1	
Lumad	 3	 3	 2	
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on marriages and cohabitations in Mindanao in 2010 
Group Christian 
Settler 
Male 
Christian 
Settler 
Female 
Muslim 
Moro Male 
Muslim 
Moro 
Female 
Lumad 
Male 
Lumad 
Female 
Frequencies 
Number of adults 4,772,515 4,597,727 1,383,880 1,419,941 936,674 882,579 
All unions 2,489,247 2,474,619 759,549 751,630 492,787 515,534 
All exogamous unions 104,939 90,311 24,161 16,242 72,722 95,469 
All exogamous marriages 90,570 79,713 22,297 14,700 63,507 82,158 
All exogamous cohabitations 14,369 10,598 1,864 1,542 9,215 13,311 
Exogamous unions (15-34 yrs) 49,225 41,594 11,976 7,686 32,940 44,943 
Exogamous marriages (15-34 yrs) 38,883 34,050 10,667 6,634 26,366 35,313 
Exogamous cohabitations (15-34 yrs) 10,342 7,544 1,309 1,052 6,574 9,630 
Percentages 
Percentage of all unions of that gender  66.5 66.1 20.3 20.1 13.2 13.8 
Exogamous unions as percentage of all unions within grp. 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.2 14.8 18.5 
Exogamous marriages as percentage of all marriages within grp. 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.0 14.3 17.8 
Exogamous cohabitations as percentage of all cohabs. within grp. 6.5 4.9 71.5 67.4 18.4 24.6 
Exog. unions as percentage of all unions within grp. (15-34 yrs) 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.0 6.7 8.7 
Exog. marriages as percentage of all marriages within grp. (15-34 yrs) 1.7 1.5 1.4 0.9 6.0 7.7 
Exog. cohabitations as percentage of all cohabs. within grp. (15-34 yrs) 4.7 3.5 50.2 46.0 13.1 17.8 
      Odds Ratios (higher number signifies higher endogamy) 
Endogamous odds ratio for all unions 291 291 5255 5255 189 189 
Endogamous odds ratio for all marriages 336 336 5733 5733 212 212 
Endogamous odds ratio for all cohabitations 56 56 64 64 69 69 
Endogamous odds ratio for unions (15-34 yrs) 208 208 3562 3562 147 147 
Endogamous odds ratio for marriages (15-34 yrs) 254 254 3878 3878 176 176 
Endogamous odds ratio for cohabitations (15-34 yrs) 49 49 54 54 60 60 
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
 
  
Table 2. T-test comparisons of means 
 Christian settler male 
Christian settler 
female Muslim Moro male 
Muslim Moro 
female Lumad male Lumad female 
 Inmarry Outmarry Inmarry Outmarry Inmarry Outmarry Inmarry Outmarry Inmarry Outmarry Inmarry Outmarry 
Between group inequality 0.08 0.11*** 0.08 0.10*** 0.07 0.05*** 0.07 0.05*** 0.14 0.10*** 0.14 0.11*** 
Proportion noncoethnics 0.14 0.22*** 0.14 0.22*** 0.31 0.80*** 0.31 0.79*** 0.71 0.82*** 0.71 0.81*** 
Spatial segregation  0.09 0.16*** 0.09 0.15*** 0.18 0.60*** 0.17 0.60*** 0.49 0.61*** 0.49 0.59*** 
Population density 309.63 234.51*** 308.04 258.59*** 638.28 338.84*** 645.3 337.35*** 159.34 227.66*** 160.19 218.39*** 
Age 28.73 28.80** 27.43 27.31*** 28.27 28.16* 27.46 27.02*** 27.75 28.77*** 26.18 27.30*** 
Educational status 2.68 2.36*** 2.85 2.70*** 2.1 2.64*** 2.15 2.61*** 1.66 2.25*** 1.79 2.35*** 
Household poverty 0.29 0.38*** 0.28 0.35*** 0.43 0.34*** 0.42 0.35*** 0.63 0.39*** 0.61 0.38*** 
Partner’s age 1.52 1.95*** -4.21 -4.14* 1.44 1.64*** -3.4 -4.32*** 2.14 1.58*** -4.46 -4.93*** 
Migrant status 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.02 0.05*** 0.02 0.04*** 
Statistical significance * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Inequality, population density, proportion of noncoethnics, and segregation all measured at municipality level. Means reported for 15-34 yr old age cohort. 
 
Table 3. Logistic regression models reporting determinants (unstandardized coefficients) of individual marriage decisions in Mindanao (15-34 yrs. 
cohort) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Christian Settler 
Males 
Christian Settler 
Females 
Muslim Moro 
Males 
Muslim Moro 
Females 
Lumad Males Lumad Females 
Ethnic inequality  2.68*** 0.75* -6.30*** -5.91*** -5.26*** -4.20*** 
 (0.40) (0.37) (0.70) (0.65) (0.36) (0.33) 
Proportion of non-coethnics  1.65*** 1.98*** 3.50*** 3.26*** 0.37** 0.33** 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.13) 
Spatial segregation  -3.03*** -3.16*** -2.73*** -3.66*** -2.09*** -2.16*** 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.18) (0.19) (0.28) (0.26) 
Population density  -0.10*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age  -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.02*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Educational status -0.21*** -0.13*** 0.20*** 0.12*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Household poverty 0.04 0.01 -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.71*** -0.75*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
Partner’s age  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Migrant status 0.00 0.11** 0.18* 0.01 0.61*** 0.51*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) 
Pseudo-R 2 (McKelvey & Zavoina)  0.121 0.101 0.524 0.568 0.161 0.143 
N 629,640 811,053 199,454 253,234 157,093 212,075 
Dependent variable 0=inmarried, 1=outmarried; unexponentiated coefficients reported; clustered robust standard errors reported in parentheses 
Statistical significance * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Inequality, population density, proportion of noncoethnics, and segregation all measured at municipality level 
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